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Modern societies are faced with the problem of how to feed, house and
ensure the well-being of their populations. They also confront the
necessity of educating their work forces and dealing with those who are
excluded from employment by reason of a shortage of opportunities,
ill-health or old age. The responses to these requirements, however,
display a considerable variety. In many of the countries of Western
Europe, with Sweden at the forefront,[1] the primary responsibility for
welfare is borne by the state. In Japan, by contrast, occupational
benefits constitute the dominant form of welfare provision.[2] They figure
prominently in the United States too, [3] and represent a mode of supplying
social services that the government of Singapore is eager to encourage.[4]
In Israel the trade union federation, the Histadrut, is centrally involved
in the fields of medical care and pensions,[5] whilst the Catholic Church
in the Republic of Ireland is active in the sphere of education.[6] In
addition to the efforts of the public sector, of employers and of
voluntary organisations, there is the private market, consisting in the
buying and selling of goods and services either through insurance schemes
or through direct payments by the consumer. Even Sweden, which has
traditionally insisted on the exclusion of profit from welfare, has been
affected by the contemporary shift in the direction of "privatisation,"[7]
although in no way as severely as Britain[8] or as Chile, an extreme
case.[9]
Numerous theories of social policy emphasise its role as a means of
control.[10] For James O'Connor, "the welfare system ...is designed
chiefly to keep social peace among unemployed workers."[11] As such, it is
a component of those activities of the state under capitalism which are
geared towards fulfilling its legitimation function. However, nearly every
governmental practice, according to O'Connor, is simultaneously aimed at
maintaining harmony as well as enhancing profitable capital accumulation.
O'Connor, then, presents an account in which the performance of these
tasks by the polity is stressed. With respect to South Africa, Alf Stadler
has argued that the state in this context is an inadequate instrument of
legitimation, because historically it has failed to make a plausible claim
to serve the general interest.[12J This, he contends, is because it has
rejected the option of incorporating Africans into central political
institutions and into the welfarist arrangements characteristic of liberal
democracies. Recent years, though, have witnessed a concerted attempt on
the part of the authorities to address what several authors describe as a
"crisis of legitimation" or of "hegemony", [13] which has been accompanied
by a serious economic downturn.[14] The initial shape their co-ordinated
efforts assumed was the Total Strategy,[15] which had, Mark Swilling
declares,[16] four major concerns, namely urban Africans, industrial
relations, the constitutional position of Coloureds and Indians, as well
as the reorganisation of the security apparatuses. Deborah Posel[17] has
drawn attention to the emergence since 1978 of the rudiments of a new
language of technocratic rationality in terms of which the state seeks
justification for its actions. This co-exists, as Stanley Greenberg, David
Yudelman and Michael Mann observe,[18] with an embryonic "free market"
ideology, which has been attended by such measures as the formal abolition
of an official presence in the African labour market. The latest phase of
reform has seen the establishment of Regional Services Councils, which are
intended to redistribute resources from white to black municipalities.[19]
What is missing from this picture, however, is the specific contribution
of business to the legitimation of the social order that is expressed as
"corporate social responsibility." This is an area in which little
academic research has been conducted. Even Stadler, for whom the situation
in South Africa differs from that in liberal capitalist societies where,
he affirms, legitimation is the domain of the polity,[20] fails to
consider the issue.
Corporate social responsibility has long been practised in the United
States of America, where a massive literature on the subject has been
generated. The group of New England businessmen known as the Boston
Associates, who were the pioneers of modern industry in that country,
displayed an active interest in the living conditions of their employees.
They were influenced by the experience of Robert Owen, who demonstrated
with his model mills in Lanarkshire in Scotland that good wages and a
healthy environment benefited entrepreneur and labourer alike. Both a
desire to avoid the squalor of European factory towns and a practical need
to attract reliable workers informed the policies of the Boston
Associates. Their endeavours to recruit the upstanding daughters of
fanning families included the provision of decent housing as well as the
religious, social and intellectual resources suited to their backgrounds.
During the 1820s and 1830s these Massachusetts textile settlements became
showplaces of the new capitalist order. 121] The company town was a
recurring feature of American industrialisation. Often located at a site
remote from the centres of population, it was compelled to offer
supplementary facilities and services in order to acquire a stable and
contented labour force. Pullman, Illinois was widely hailed as the
exemplary community of this type. Built in the 1880s, it represented an
investment of $8 million by the Pullman Palace Car Company in such
amenities as tenements, parks, playgrounds, an arcade, a theatre, a casino
and a military band. The motives of the Pullman Company were not entirely
benevolent. Outstanding among them was combatting trade unionism. It was
somewhat ironic, then, that Pullman workers sparked off a strike in 1894
that was settled only after federal intervention was invoked by President
Cleveland.[22]
In the early years of this century, two individuals epitomised the rather
distinct paths corporate giving was to take in the United States.[23] For
Andrew Carnegie, the sole purpose of being rich was to be a
philanthropist. God, Carnegie asserted, wants us to do well so that we can
do good. By contrast, Julius Rosenwald's credo was that one had to do good
to do well. Rosenwald realised that the success of Sears Roebuck, a firm
he had bought at near bankruptcy, was contingent upon the prosperity of
its customer, the farmer, and this depended on the latter's skill,
productivity and competence. The country farm agent and the 4-H Club were
Sears Roebuck's advertising, public relations and above all market
development, leading to its becoming within ten years of its purchase by
Rosenwald the biggest of the world's great merchants. Whilst Carnegie thus
viewed wealth as a source of charity, and spawned a foundation to dispense
it,[24] Rosenwald regarded the social engagement of business as an
investment yielding a profitable return. Following in Rosenwald's
footsteps was James Couzens, co-founder of the Ford Motor Company, who
introduced skills training into American industry. He also established the
famous "five dollar a day" wage, as a cure for rates of absenteeism and
turnover so high as to threaten Ford's competitive position in the market
place.
The Progressive era in American history saw big business under assault,
and as criticism mounted, a diversity of reactions was forthcoming. The
National Association of Manufacturers launched an aggressive
counterattack, but in Chicago a group of business leaders involved
themselves in programmes of civic improvement, beautification and cultural
enrichment. At U.S. Steel a plan for employees' stock ownership was
proposed in order to head off unionisation and to ensure a satisfied,
efficient staff. Certain enterprises initiated welfare schemes for their
personnel, often for similar reasons. As calls for governmental regulation
of business grew more shrill, executives increasingly recognised the
importance of courting popular favour. By 1917 many of the larger
companies had public relations teams.[25] The drive to woo and win
consumers intensified in the 1920s, and the efforts of firms to cultivate
support were paralleled by the endeavours of trade associations. The
notion of management as a "trusteeship" with an obligation to promote
social well-being was vigorously espoused in some quarters.[26] It was,
though, the encounter of business with organised charity in the 1920s that
laid the foundations for institutionalised corporate giving. The result
was the creation of the national Community Chest movement, and the process
that was under way was boosted by the passage in 1935 of legislation
allowing for donations by companies to be tax deductible up to 5% of
annual pre-tax income.[27]
The period immediately after World War Two brought new claimants upon
corporate time and treasure. The most effective were colleges and
universities. The arts were another realm in which enterprises discovered
an interest, as were religion and politics.[28] Social responsibility,
however, came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, as firms experienced the
challenge of the civil rights movement, the ghetto riots, consumer and
environmental activists, militant stakeholders as well as of growing state
encroachment on their autonomy. "As the 1970s began," Neil Jacoby
observes, "it could be said that at no time in history had American
business been subjected to a more widespread criticism."[29] It became
clear, James Chrisman and Archie Carroll contend, that "business could not
ignore social issues without sacrificing its legitimacy as an
institution."[30] This awareness was translated into such initiatives as
the Urban Coalition, the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation and
Detroit Renaissance Incorporated, the objective of which was the
revitalisation of the inner cities.131] The National Alliance of
Businessmen was formed to place residents of depressed localities in
jobs,[32] whilst the Interracial Council for Business Opportunity and the
Rochester Business Opportunities Corporation were founded to stimulate
black entrepreneurship.[33]
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination in employment. To
enforce its provisions, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was
established. Under the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act. employers
are required to submit annual reports to the Commission on the
occupational status of their employees, who are identified by
minority-group membership and by sex. An individual may not be denied
promotion based on seniority. In addition, companies dealing with the
government are obliged to file Affirmative Action Plans. The intent is to
ensure that the number of workers they hire or advance is proportionate to
the minority population of the area in which they are situated. The
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federal authorities have also encouraged business to recruit amongst
disadvantaged communities by sponsoring training programmes such as Job
Opportunities in the Business Sector, with the participation of the
National Alliance of Businessmen, the Job Corps, and various local
manpower development efforts. Tax exemptions, moreover, are granted for
portions of the wages paid by enterprises during the training of people
classified as poor.[343
The internal policies of a company vis-a-visits personnel can, of
course, affect its financial performance, as can its external engagements.
Preferential recruitment and the provision of training can have a positive
impact upon motivation and productivity. Levi Strauss, for instance,
pledged itself early on to hire at least 5* of its new workers from the
hardcore unemployed. With special courses a retention rate equal to that
of regular employees was achieved. Furthermore, it systematically upgraded
minority—group members to supervisory and managerial positions. It has
reaped the economic rewards of this strategy, which is complemented by the
allocation of three per cent of its net after taxes to outside causes. [35]
The contemporary reformulation of the Rosenwald thesis is in terms of the
idea of "enlightened self-interest," which stresses that social
involvement and profit maximisation, contrary to the claims of Milton
Friedman, [36] are quite compatible. [37] More and more American firms,
according to Timothy Mescon and Donn Tilson,[38] are acting upon this
insight, and professionalising their approach to corporate giving by
setting goals as well as establishing special staffs to administer their
contributions. Many executives, they argue, have realised that social
responsibility should be integrated into the ordinary running of the
enterprise instead of being practised on an ad hoc basis. A prominent
development has been the centralisation of social and political functions
in a single department of public affairs. This has the task of
coordinating relations with the community as well as with the state and
the media. [39] A number of companies have also published reports on their
social interventions, even though, unlike the situation in France, this is
not required by law. [40]
Mescon and Tilson point to a trend towards greater visibility on the part
of businesses in their donations, as they seek good will and higher sales.
As they profit, these authors declare, "they will ensure the survival of
the private enterprise system. By improving the quality of life in the
community, corporations will justify their existence ...and eventually
earn the public mandate necessary for long-term success."141] American
enterprise, William Frederick remarks, "has learned during the 1960s and
1970s that social responsibility benefits business. It projects a good and
caring image of an otherwise monolithic organisation. It dampens down the
fires of social upheaval and revolution. It produces a more satisfied and
perhaps a more politically stable environment in which to conduct
business. It may offset further inroads into business decision-making by
government or dissident social groups."[42] It should, then, be
distinguished from charity, which is not for gain. What ought to be
remembered, though, is that, of the total voluntary giving in the United
States of $87,22 billion in 1986, $71,72 billion was by individuals.
Foundations, of which 23 600 are active, dispensed $4,7 billion in grants,
representing 7,2* of their combined assets of approximately $64,5
billion. This exceeded the 5% demanded by law. Corporations contributed
$4,5 billion, or 5,2% of the overall amount. This was a decrease from
1,97% of pre-tax net income in 1985 to 1,91% in 1986. well below the 1O%
that is now tax deductible under Internal Revenue Service rules.[43]
Corporate social responsibility, it should be noted, eludes easy
definition. It is often contrasted with the traditional view of business,
which finds forceful expression in Milton Friedman's famous argument.
"There is," for Friedman, "one and only one social responsibility of
business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits ...Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very
foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials
of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their
stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive
doctrine."[44] What Friedman, however, fails to perceive is that social
engagement, far from necessarily entailing economic losses, may actually
produce financial rewards. It is the notion of advantage to both companies
and the community that the principle of "enlightened self-interest"
conveys. A frequently cited position is that of A.A. Sommer, a former
member of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States.
Social responsibility, according to Sommer, means that a firm "voluntarily
expends its resources to do something not required by law and without
immediate economic benefits."[45] This conception, though, is a little too
restrictive, because gains may be "immediate", on any recognised
understanding of the term. Yet, the idea that such behaviour is uncoerced
is useful, and this will be adopted in the discussion of enterprises in
South Africa. So too will the social involvement of companies in this
country be construed as an investment. It is hence designed to yield a
return, which may be economic or of another kind. This is not to exclude
philanthropy from the gamut of business activities. The Donald Gordon
Foundation, for instance, which is funded personally by the Liberty Life
chairman, lends much support to Jewish and other causes.[46] Charity is
doubtless practised by numerous businessmen. It is not, however, the
dominant mode of corporate giving, and will not be a matter for
consideration here.
Social responsibility hence refers to those obligations of business that
are voluntarily assumed, that, unlike philanthropy, are undertaken for
advantage, and that extend beyond the duty to shareholders to employees
and the wider community. It can therefore be directed at internal as well
as external groups. In addition, it benefits its recipients in a way that
advertising in, say, the media does not. The man proclaiming the virtues
of a garlic polony, or the model gazing vacantly into the camera, offer,
at best, information on a tasty means of acquiring halitosis or on the
dress that can make any woman universally desirable. By contrast, social
responsibility furnishes its targets with a more direct and tangible gain,
be it houses or schooling or perquisites for staff. It might be contended
that the sponsorship of, for example, a sports tournament profits the
participants in a manner unlike the giant billboard from which a pretty
person peers. This, however, is a pure marketing venture, and is defended
solely on these grounds. Social involvement, though, whilst it may indeed
have an immediate commercial spin-off, is not justified on this basis
alone. Although it may, then, have a short-term effect, it tends to be
seen in a long-range perspective.
With respect to the personnel of a firm, social responsibility would
encompass those aspects of their welfare which the company is not
compelled either by law or by force of custom to provide. Thus, whilst
there are instances of enterprises in capitalist societies not paying
their workers, as in the Nazi Reich,[47] this is ordinarily not the case.
Wages per se are therefore not an element of social involvement, but the
offering of high financial rewards might be. Trade unions may, of course,
incorporate the well-being of their members into their collective
bargaining with management, and one might still wish to include what
results from the pressures they exert, even if unwillingly conceded,
within the ambit of corporate social responsibility. When dealing with
this subject, then, rough edges appear. This is evident in the
administration of social engagement, where there is significant
disagreement on what precisely this involves, and no uniformity of
practice. A similar lack of consensus, even of clarity, characterises the
writings on the issue. Although there is a dearth of scholarly analysis,
the same cannot be said about normative prescriptions, journalistic and
other accounts in popular fora, as well as articles and conference papers
by people operating in the field.
Whilst the state in South Africa does directly contribute to the relief of
social distress, this is viewed as a supplementary duty. The major onus
lies with the individual himself, the family and the community. [481 The
authorities are explicit about their limited, residual role. "The
Government in the Republic of South Africa does not accept full
responsibility for its citizens* welfare. Furthermore, not one of the
principles of a welfare state is accepted or applied."[491 Successive
Nationalist administrations, whilst active in such areas as education,
housing and health, have been consistently and adamantly opposed to the
elaboration of many of the social-democratic institutions of the Western
European kind-[50] In so far as whites are concerned, apartheid has
traditionally functioned as a surrogate for those sorts of arrangements by
providing for what Lawrence Schlemmer calls their "popular material
interests".[51] The rights of Africans, however, have been crucially
affected, as Stadler argues,[52] by Stallardism and its Verwoerdian
variant, which linked certain, but not all, claims to benefits to labour
service. Thus, he maintains, the purpose behind the broadening of the
scope of public medical interventions during the 1930s and 1940s was the
supply of a healthy work force. The involvement of the polity, though, can
be traced at least as far back as 1911. In terms of the Native Labour
Regulation Act, compensation was to be given in the case of either the
incapacitation or the death of a worker.[53] In 1913 came legislation to
protect children. The Old Age Pensions Act of 1928 brought pensions for
whites and coloureds, with these being granted to Indians as well as
Africans in 1944.154] In 1937 a Department of Social Welfare, with
jurisdiction over the whole population, was formed, and the same year
witnessed the first statutory attempt to introduce unemployment insurance.
During the Second World War the establishment of a national contributory
social security system was rejected by Parliament.[55] Yet, there were
improvements for blacks in such fields as workmen's compensation,
unemployment insurance, health and secondary education, although none of
these resulted in the expenditure of large sums of money.[56]
The post-1948 period saw the extension of apartheid into the sphere of
welfare, with the creation of separate state departments for different
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races. In 1966 private organisations were directed to deliver services on
a segregated basis. Little opposition to this measure was offered, as they
had come to be heavily dependent on the government for funding. [57] The
voluntary sector, which comprises at present some 1 600 local
organisations, is still reliant on subsidies, which in 1982-83 amounted to
almost R82 million.[58] One of the consequences of the homelands policy
was increasingly to impose from the 1960s onwards welfare functions on the
Bantustans. Their outlay on these, with few of the resources available to
metropolitan South Africa, represents a greater proportion of their much
smaller budgets.159} The 1983 constitution confirmed the principle of
ethnicity by making welfare an "own affair" for whites, coloureds and
Indians.
If the interventions of the state, then, in the area of welfare have been
rather narrow in their scope, so too, historically, have been those of
business. For South Africa has travelled the labour-repressive route with
regard to the African working class.[60] Not that there has never been
any straying from this path. Eddie Webster refers[61] to an incident that
occurred in 1918, when Sol Plaatje approached De Beers, asking them to
donate a disused tram shed to the African population of Kimberley as a
meeting and recreation hall. Against the backdrop of unrest on the Rand,
such a gift was a valuable opportunity to demonstrate the generosity of a
major employer of Africans. A carefully orchestrated public celebration of
the magnanimity of the company would, furthermore, nip in the bud any
socialist appeals to the black workers of the town. Efforts to win support
for the firm in the local community, and amongst employees, as Webster
notes, are as old as capitalism. During the 1890s, Belinda Bozzoli has
shown,[62] the liberal managerialism espoused by ideologists of mining
capital aimed to encourage skilled white labour to remain on a single
mine, and develop ties which would reduce its bargaining power as well as
the costs of high turnover. Housing was the means whereby this was to be
achieved. At Kimberley the policy of accommodating personnel in a suburban
estate, Kenilworth, had been an endeavour to foster their loyalty. This
was mooted as a possible option for the Rand, for it could ensure
stability, co-operation and even lower wages. It could, moreover, be
supplemented by other mechanisms, such as medical and insurance funds.
Schools, hospitals and a village for married men were also suggested, and
were considered to have the potential of cheapening labour by offering
permanency. Housing schemes were implemented on many mines during the
1900s, in order to decrease the means of subsistence of white workers, and
cultivate respectability.[63]
In its designs for Africans, however, mining capital was considerably more
modest. Proposals for settling workers and catering for their families
were advanced, but came to little. [64] More ambitious was the ideology of
liberalism, which rose to prominence between the world wars. It was
associated, according to Bozzoli,[65] with the rising national
bourgeoisie, and it included appeals for an improvement of the conditions
of the working class, so as to prevent it from confronting capital. There
was also a call for a type of conciliation with blacks. Yet, the strategy
that was conceived was in no way to lead to a united proletariat.
Labourers who were first and foremost separated and cheap were to be
controlled through the creation of a small incorporationist outlet for a
tiny minority. To the extent that this occurred, she contends, it was
through such bodies as the universities, the Institute of Race Relations,
the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives, and certain black trade
unions, not the central state. The market, though, became the key issue
around which the interests of national capital could be realised. Whites,
because their power was greater than that of Africans, confronted
employers with the fait accompli of higher wages. They were hence the most
obvious target for the consumerist initiative launched by commerce and
industry. Their progressive embourgeoisement was reinforced by the
promotion by business of the suburban nuclear family. Exporting had to
wait until mass production lowered the costs of South African goods,
whilst black consumption could not be increased without damaging
profitability. The expansion of the market, then, did not extend to
Africans in a manner that might have issued in something other than a
labour-repressive outcome. Nor did liberalism entrench itself within the
apparatuses of government, although it was by no means absent. [66] It was
thus relegated, Bozzoli declares, to a secondary place in the social
order.
The same liberals, Bozzoli affirms,{671 who were concerned to ameliorate
the plight of black workers were the chief advocates in the 1940s of
personnel managerial solutions to the problem of the growing strength of
the African proletariat. These were seen as capable of projecting a
favourable image of capitalism as well as of assisting in the improvement
of productivity and the maintenance of harmony within the production
process. For some, they were also a means of preventing trade unionism. On
the whole, though, industry was in favour of the statutory recognition of
African trade unions.[68] The advent of the Nationalist government in
1948, however, dashed any hopes of these measures being adopted. By 1952,
according to David Lewis,[69] industry had modified its position on the
question of recognition. Employers, moreover, resented the imposition by
Hendrik Verwoerd of a levy to finance housing for urban Africans.[70]
Apart from this, S.S. Lemmer notes,[71] the role of the private sector in
the provision of housing and associated social facilities was largely
confined, until the 1970s, to the subsidisation by the mines of their
white employees, their acceptance of a responsibility to accommodate
African migrants, and the construction of various recreational complexes.
Some other businesses, such as the parastatal corporations Iscor and
Sasol, catered for certain of the welfare needs of their white staff.
In the early 1970s the great boom of the previous decade finally ran out
of steam. Representatives of industry. Matthew Chaskalson observes,[72]
diagnosed the root of the downturn as economic apartheid. White population
growth had proved unable to meet the demand for skilled and semi-skilled
manpower that the investment of the 1960s had generated. Already in 1968
leading Afrikaner businessmen such as Albert Wessels of Toyota and Dr.P.E.
Rousseau of Sasol were publicly calling for more technical training for
blacks.[73] During 1971, according to Jonathan Hyslop,[74] big business
and its allies moved to a more activist stance, as the lack of black
employees with suitable education became increasingly apparent. At the
same time, liberal agitation had popularised the question of schooling.
Capital and its supporters in the United Party and the English press
argued that the economy would be unable to expand further without the
better utilisation of African labour.[75] Training was identified as the
panacea for the problem of low productivity and even of a narrow
market.[76]
Business began to contribute substantially to educational causes.[77]
Polaroid supplied money to ASSECA, a black education group. Reckitt and
Coleman pledged to invest R100 000 in bursaries and extra-curricular
activities at schools. Anglo American gave R160 OOO to the Johannesburg
City Council for a junior secondary school in Soweto, whilst Barlow Rand
established the C.S. Barlow Foundation, with a first project of spending
R700 OOO on a trade school in Lebowa. Such donations were possible because
they were made to the City Council or to individuals, thus circumventing
the prohibition imposed by the Department of Bantu Education on gifts to
schools. The Star launched its TEACH fund, combining altruism with "the
enlightened self-interest of employers whose firms [would] gain immensely
in efficiency if their African staff [were] trained to be literate and
responsible." After Len Miller, chairman of the OK Bazaars, provided
Rl 500 for a classroom in January 1972 and urged his colleagues to do
likewise, there was a rapid increase in the level of support for this
initiative.
Around the beginning of 1972, Hyslop contends,[78] a change occurred in
government policy on black education, when it was accepted that
expenditure on schooling would no longer be linked to African taxation,
but would be financed from state consolidated revenue funds. This was part
of a renewed attempt to accommodate the requirements of capital for
skilled and permanent African labour. Major strides towards providing
facilities for African workers were also taken. By 1974 the authorities
were involved in a scheme to establish 16 training centres in the larger
urban areas, half of them to be run by themselves and the others by
industry. In addition, favourable consideration was being given to the
construction of trade schools in urban localities. The Income Tax Act of
1962 was amended to permit employers to recover 82 cents of each rand
spent on training programmes approved by the Department of Bantu
Education.[79] As the administration abandoned its previous hostility to
private-sector interventions, TEACH was publicly praised by several
officials.[80]
These shifts precipitated an energetic participation by business in
educational projects.[81] More importantly, though, they struck a blow at
the commitment of the Nationalists to grand apartheid. For if African
workers were to be equipped for skilled employment in "white" South
Africa, their claim to permanence there would be more difficult to resist.
This was acknowledged by elements within the state. [82] It seems
difficult, then, to escape the conclusion that the economic growth of the
1960s made possible at least some of the transformations that occurred in
the following decade. In the meantime, the sports boycott and the
disinvestment movement were gathering momentum overseas. Internally, the
government was being exposed to criticism from unexpected quarters, such
as the Hederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, the Institute of Administrators of
Non-European Affairs, and the Afrikaans press. In this context, reformist
currents began to surface within the National Party. Theo Gerdener, while
Minister of the Interior, warned that long-term peace would be impossible
unless the authorities closed the wage gap. Piet Koornhof established a
verliate base within the Department of Bantu Affairs, which was
consolidated by Punt Janson, his successor.[83] The pressure for change,
moreover, emanating from liberal capitalists intensified. During the
course of 1972 and 1973 their appeals, in addition to training, centred on
the abolition of petty apartheid, the encouragement of black
entrepreneurs, and the promotion of African home ownership. Such pleas
were endorsed by the United Party.184] Afrikaner business joined the
chorus as well. Sanlam announced the elimination of all discrimination
within its ranks. The president of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut called
for a more enlightened labour policy, whilst the Afrikaner Sakekamer was
told to accept the permanency of urban Africans and to improve conditions
in the townships as well as in the factories.[85]
The Durban strikes of 1973 gave added impetus to these moves. The
pro-government media criticised African wage levels, whilst Prime Minister
John Vorster urged employers to see their workers "as human beings with
souls." Furthermore, in a celebrated address to the Motor Industries
Federation, Vorster appeared to sanction African job advancement. The
state also amended the 1953 Settlement of Disputes Act to allow Africans a
limited right to strike, and to "improve communication1* between them and
management.[86] In 1975 30-year leaseholds for urban blacks were
reintroduced, and there was a turnabout in official policy towards
Affrican entrepreneurs.[87] In the constitutional sphere too, important
changes were proposed in the mid-1970s, and the origins of the present
tricamera 1 dispensation can be traced to this period.[88] The industrial
unrest heightened business anxiety about the inadequacy of the educational
system. Spokesmen for commerce and manufacturing, according to
Hyslop,[89] presented the lack of educational opportunity as a grievance
which had contributed to the strike wave and possibly to political
discontent. They contended that changes in this regard would quiet the
situation. There was, in addition, the by now familiar concern with
technical and clerical training. Consolidated Gold Fields donated
R186 000 to TEACH for junior secondary schools to be sited next to
industrial training centres, so that pupils could be taken there for
technical courses. The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce discussed a plan
to establish a commercial college in Soweto.[90]
It was the Soweto uprising of 1976 that galvanised the business community
into further activity. The Transvaal Chamber of Industries was quick to
respond. In July it sent the Prime Minister a memorandum, advocating,
inter alia, improved amenities, an urgent review of discriminatory laws,
the streamlining of influx control, the payment of attention to the issue
of vertical occupational mobility for Africans, free and compulsory
education, the elimination of the housing backlog, the recognition of a
category of Africans as permanently urbanised, and the elevation of
townships to full municipal status. [91] The motives informing these
demands were clearly set forth. "The thought most basic to our submission
is the need to ensure a stable, contented urbanised black community in our
metropolitan urban areas ... The emergence of a "middle class' with
Western-type material needs and ambitions has already occurred in these
areas. The mature, family-oriented urban black already places the
stability of his household uppermost and is more interested in his pay
packet than in politics. Our prime point of departure should be that this
"middle class1 is not weakened by frustration and indignity. Only by
having this most responsible section of the urban black on our side can
the whites in South Africa be assured of containing on a long term basis
the irresponsible economic and political ambitions of those blacks who are
influenced against their own real interests from within and without our
borders."[92]
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The outbreak of rioting in 1976," according to Harry Oppenheimer, former
chairman of Anglo American, "was generally and correctly seen as markina a
turning point in South African history. It was widely recognised that
individual South Africans had to do something practical about the
situation ... This feeling was particularly strongly felt in the business
world."[93] Collectively- big capital reacted by launching the Urban
Foundation in December 1976. Anton Rupert of the Rembrandt Group, who was
to become deputy chairman of the Urban Foundation, described the
organisation as "a catalyst [for] the transformation of South Africa's
urban black communities into stable, essentially middle-class societies
subscribing to the values of a free enterprise society and having a vested
interest in their own survival."(941 The events of 1976, Oppenheimer
noted, "were based in the bitter resentment of all blacks of everything
that is commonly expressed by the phrase "the policy of apartheid1."(95]
Yet. as Jan Steyn. executive director of the Urban Foundation, later put
it, "As things stand, free enterprise is seen and accepted as part of "The
System*. This system is unequivocally rejected for its perceived support
of oppression and apartheid."[96] There seems little doubt that, in the
view of business, the disturbances that began in Soweto, thereafter
spreading to other black townships, posed a grave challenge to the
capitalist order. At the same time, the state was experiencing the threat
of domestic conflict as well as of the decolonisation of Mozambique and
Angola, in the context of a faltering economy.[97]
The various pressures for reform issued in an initiative that assumed a
coherent form under the premiership of P.W. Botha. A central dimension of
this Total Strategy[98] was the attempt to generate elements within black
society with a stake in capitalism, who would, it was thought, function as
a factor of political stability. As Botha declared. "We hope to create a
middle class among the nations of South Africa. Because, if a man has
possessions and is able to build his family life around these possessions,
then one has already laid the foundation for resisting Communism. If
anyone has something to protect, to keep as his own. then he fights
Communism more readily."[99] The 1970s, as Posel remarks, exposed the
mounting limitations of the near-total reliance by the authorities on
repression as a means of control over the black population.[100] The quest
for legitimacy undertaken by the government has received much scholarly
attention.[1011 The academic literature, however, has tended to neglect
the efforts made by business to sell capitalism to a sceptical African
populace. In the media too, numerous commentators have focused upon the
public, high-profile stance of capital, or its private exchanges with
state officials, in such a way as to suggest that these are the sum total
of its political interventions. Hence, in a 1988 article, Steven Friedman
discusses the decline of "the pressures which pushed parts of [business]
into a reformist frenzy a couple of years ago,"[102] whilst Christo Nel
refers to the "resurgence of managerial conservatism"[103] and the "mood
of passivity"[104] within the ranks of capital. Duncan Innes is also cited
as predicting in 1987 "fewer demands from businessmen for reform."[105]
Whilst this is true at one level, what is not considered is that aspect of
corporate behaviour that is manifested as social responsibility. It is
only on an illegitimately narrow understanding of politics that this
conduct can be disregarded. Furthermore, far from diminishing in force
during the second half of the 1980s, it has in fact intensified. In this
respect, therefore, business is not merely active, but increasingly so. It
has embarked on an independent course of seeking to convince Africans of
the value of private enterprise by extending its advantages to them. In
this manner it has endeavoured to distance itself from apartheid, which
has operated to exclude many of them from these benefits. Thus the
Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa (ASSOCOM) commented in
the wake of the outbreak of violence in Soweto. "If the free enterprise
system is to be accepted by the less privileged population groups in the
country it must be seen by them to be meeting their legitimate
grievances."11061
As in the American case, the assumption of social responsibility by South
African business reveals a mix of motivations. Foremost among these is a
political concern, namely the desire to preserve capitalism and combat
socialism. In the words of Harold Groom, former president of ASSOCOM, and
corporate relations manager at the Old Mutual, "There is no doubt that the
free enterprise system is at risk in South Africa. ... For its survival as
the alternative to socialism, the free enterprise system ... must
deliberately become more acutely socially responsive and pro-active, by
creating opportunities for entry into the system. Thus, corporate social
responsibility in this sense, must be accepted as an obligation by every
business not only for its own survival but for that of the country as an
economic, social and political entity capable of meeting the aspirations
of present and future generations."[107] As Pat O'Malley of Mobil
observes, "We know from the history of post-independent Africa that the
free enterprise system, where it was established, was pretty quickly
changed to one of African socialism. In this country, because the blacks
cannot see what the free enterprise system has to offer them there is
every danger that they are going to replace it with something they
perceive to be better. I believe that social corporate responsibility is
the reality of demonstrating and bringing out changes, so that black
people can see we have something to offer them."[1081 Frans Cronje of
Nedbank puts it more baldly, "It's the defence of capitalism. Corporations
have realised they can't just sit back and make profits."11091
Increasingly, however, many businessmen have recognised that there is no
contradiction between social involvement and profits, at least in the
longer term. A South African version of the Rosenwald position is given
forceful expression by Anton Roodt, a general manager of Federale
Volksbeleggings. "I would argue with others in favour of an attitude of
"enlightened self-interest' as the most viable business strategy towards
social responsibility. This means that business perceives appropriate
social responsibility action to be an integral part of, and not in any way
separate from its primary function of profitably producing and
distributing goods or services."(1101 For Tony Bloom, the then chairman
of the Premier Group, the "policy of active involvement in community
affairs is clearly in the long-term interests of the Group and its
shareholders, and we hope that the Group will earn the image of a generous
and participative member of the communities in which it operates. Our
involvement arises not only because it is in the interests of the Group,
but also because it is right - there can be no profits for business in a
disintegrating community, a community characterised by civil unrest,
unemployment and crime."till] Political and economic objectives are
indissolubly interlinked. For the search for a stable capitalism,
unthreatened by "civil unrest", is simultaneously the creation of an
environment in which enterprises can continue to exist and be profitable.
Social engagement, then, is good business sense, in that it strives to
secure a future for private enterprise.
This does not. though, necessarily translate into the use of social
responsibility as a marketing device for short-term commercial gain. In a
number of instances, as, for example, with Pick *n Pay, it certainly does
operate in this fashion. Even here, however, other factors are at play, as
its chairman. Raymond Ackerman, acknowledges. "Social responsibility is
really enlightened self-interest; it's not just do-gooding. It's part of
building a framework for one's business in society, giving as well as
taking, and looking to the future."[112] Hence, whilst social engagement
may enhance the image of a firm in the eyes of the customer, and thereby
sell more products, many companies in fact adopt a low-profile approach to
the matter. Details of expenditure are often publicly unavailable, and
high-visibility advertising of involvement is usually avoided. Such
caution may be to prevent potential objections by shareholders. This was
identified as a reason for circumspection by several of the corporate
officials active in the administration of social responsibility who were
interviewed for this study. There may also be a degree of embarrassment
amongst some executives at the modesty of their outlays as compared with
various other enterprises. More important, perhaps, is the desire for
credibility and the attempt to establish bona fides amongst the groups at
whom business giving is directed. As Groom of the Old. Mutual remarks.
"Naturally [people] resent being seen as beneficiaries of projects that
are largely there for public relations purposes. We are conscious that we
are dealing with projects that are designed to aid blacks, and so mustn't
overdo the publicity angle."[113] A lack of discretion could thus
increase the possibility of rejection. There is. of course, another factor
prompting much corporate social activity. As shortages in such areas as
skills and housing have appeared, businessmen have become concerned about
the ability of the state to provide the social and economic infrastructure
they require. They have accordingly expanded their interventions in these
spheres.
The subject of corporate social responsibility received its first serious
public mention in South Africa in 1972, when it formed the topic of the
inaugural address of Meyer Feldberg as professor of business
administration at the University of Cape Town. He called upon South
African executives to follow the example of their American counterparts,
warning that "responsibilities must ultimately be shouldered if the South
African businessman is to endure and serve all society."[114] In 1977 John
Simpson followed suit by stating that business schools should offer
leadership in social responsibility by clarifying the issue, including it
in their curricula, and researching corporate practice. An outcome of this
was the establishment at the University of Cape Town of the only chair at
a South African business school in applied social ethics.[1151 Social
involvement became more widespread after the Soweto uprising in 1976 and
the formation of the Urban Foundation, as capital responded to a perceived
challenge to its legitimacy. Just as American businessmen learnt in the
1960s race riots that they could not take social stability for granted, so
something similar occurred here following the Soweto unrest. In addition,
the larger South African corporations, by virtue of their size and market
power, could begin, without much competitive disadvantage, to devote some
of their resources to tackling the problems that had emerged as distinct
constraints on their further growth.1116]
During the 1970s, moreover, increasingly strident demands for foreign
firms to disinvest from South Africa were heard from anti-apartheid
movements and Black Africa. A number of these enterprises sought to defend
themselves by launching programmes to enable them to claim they were a
force for good in the African community. [117] In March 1977 the Reverend
Leon Sullivan, after working closely for three months with a group of 12
American companies operating in South Africa, promulgated the code of
conduct known as the Sullivan Principles.[118] Those American concerns
that were signatories to the code committed themselves to non-segregation
in facilities; equal and fair employment practices; equal pay for equal
work; training and developing black staff; augmenting the number of blacks
in managerial and supervisory positions; and improving the quality of life
of employees outside the work environment in such areas as housing,
transport, education, health and recreation amenities.[119] Sullivan
insisted on regular reporting by signatories, firstly for review by their
outside auditors, and then for evaluation. This was conducted by the
Arthur D. Little Company, an independent management consultancy
headquartered in the United States, to which they were required each year
to submit a questionnaire. Their compliance with the Principles was
assessed, and their performance rated.[120] A code of conduct was also
adopted by the European Economic Community. This theoretically applies to
all companies from the member states with interests in South Africa. Only
the British government, however, makes any effort at all to track
implementation. Its published report, though, on the activities of British
enterprises is so brief and vague as to be almost meaningless. Yet, one
feature of this monitoring process is that individual corporate reports
are open to public scrutiny in London and at British diplomatic missions
in South Africa.[121] These initiatives obviously had an effect upon the
social engagement of American and European subsidiaries. Furthermore,
they prompted the Urban Foundation and the South African Consultative
Committee on Labour Affairs (Saccola), in which 10 employer bodies
participate, to formulate broad guidelines, without an enforcement
mechanism, for South African businesses.[122]
In a 1979 study based upon the responses to questionnaires of executives
in 123 listed companies, C.F. Wagenaar detected "a growing social
awareness among South African business leaders."[123] Business, he noted,
was becoming increasingly involved in the problems of the country, with
managers being exposed to greater demands in this regard. Janis Galombik,
in a 1980 report, [124] examined the social commitment of 66 South African
firms and of 48 foreign-controlled enterprises operating in South Africa.
The latter, she discovered, had a more positive attitude towards social
responsibility, with their policies less dependent upon profits and the
personal attitudes of chief executives. They were more strongly influenced
by shareholder pressures and by codes of conduct. However, the behaviour
of the large South African companies surveyed, that is those with annual
pre-tax profits of R20 million upwards, was more in line with that of the
foreign subsidiaries. They considered the projection of a favourable
corporate image to be an important determinant of the extent of community
engagement. They placed less emphasis, though, than did medium-sized South
African businesses, with profits of between R5 million and R20 million, on
the direct benefits which could accrue from such activity. According to
Galombik, the political ramifications of social responsibility were an
extremely important concern, for companies believed it "had a role to play
in preserving a market oriented, free-enterprise system in South
Africa."[125]
Galombik's findings also revealed that administrative practices with
respect to donations, grants and gifts in kind were underdeveloped, with
most allocations being made on an ad hoc basis. The largest percentage of
funds went to tertiary education. Firms were hence taking advantage of the
tax concessions allowed on such contributions. Any donations by a company
to a university, technikon or similar institution, as well as to an
"education fund", are, by South African law, deductible from its taxable
income, up to a maximum of 5%. In order to qualify for an exemption, it
must be shown that the expenditures were incurred in the production of
revenue and wholly for the purposes of trade. Philanthropy is hereby
discouraged, whilst institutions such as the Urban Foundation, schools and
welfare organisations are put at a disadvantage in attracting corporate
support. In the United States, by contrast, no constraints of this sort
are imposed on the kind of cause an enterprise can finance.[126] In 1977
Jan Steyn made representation to the Minister of Finance to permit donors
to the Urban Foundation to claim such contributions as a tax deduction.
The request was denied on the grounds that a precedent would otherwise be
set and other bodies would apply for the same concession. The result would
be a substantial decrease in fiscal revenue, which the state would find
unacceptable.[1271 Where the authorities have been more generous, however,
is with regard to training. In terms of the Income Tax Act of 1982,
businesses which had their schemes approved by the Department of Manpower
could have 92% of their costs borne by the government through tax
rebates.[128]
Corporate social responsibility in South Africa really became a growth
industry in the 1980s. Whilst Jules Urdang observed in his 1983 study that
contributions by South African firms represented about 0,5% of pre-tax
profits, which was less than was the case in 1980, and was lower than the
level of giving of companies in the United States,[129] in overall terms
expenditure has increased dramatically during the course of the decade.
This has occurred whilst South Africa has experienced the most serious
economic recession since the 1930s.[130] Craig Charney estimated that the
leading enterprises in the country probably put upwards of R100 million
into social action in 1982.[131] In 1985 the journal Management stated
that businesses planned to donate nearly R200 million that year to an ever
widening array of projects.[132] A recent survey[133] concluded that about
R500 million was spent in 1987 on external social responsibility,
excluding the approximately R100 million that went into sport
sponsorships. Of this, some 60% was channelled into education, 16% into
social welfare and health services, 9% into housing, 4% into art and
culture, 3% into environmental causes, and the remaining 8% into other
areas. Given that between 65-70% of the total social responsibility
budget, on average, is earmarked for internal allocation to employees, the
aggregate amounts concerned are indeed substantial.
Yet, as Christopher Orpen discovered in a 1987 study,[134] the attitudes
of South African managers to community involvement are less favourable
than their American counterparts. Nonetheless, social engagement is here
to stay, certainly with respect to the large companies. This seems to be
confirmed by Mahommed Jangda, who performed a content analysis of various
chairman's statements published between 1971 and 1986. He concluded that
over this period there had emerged a heightened sensitivity to the outside
environment.[135] Already in 1983 Cronje of Nedbank remarked, "Twenty
or 30 years ago, boards of directors never discussed these things. Now,
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what's being done to solve social problems is an item at almost every
meeting."[1361 Or as Peter Searle of Volkswagen of South Africa put it a
few years later, "The question for South African business is no longer
whether it should be spending money on its social and community
responsibility - the question is rather how much?"[1371 Several factors
contributed to this burgeoning of social responsibility in the 1980s, both
as a corporate activity and as a conference theme. The escalation during
1984 and 1985 of what Bloom described as "civil unrest" was one element,
whilst mounting disinvestment pressure on foreign subsidiaries, compelling
a number of them to justify their continued presence in South Africa
through greater social commitment, was another. Project Free Enterprise,
undertaken by the School of Business Leadership at the University of South
Africa, was also of importance. First reporting in 1984, it found that
black workers displayed "a high level of resistance towards business and
the free market which [were] perceived as being exploitative by
nature."[138J Mike Rosholt, chairman of Barlow Rand, registered the alarm
with which this report was greeted by employers. Project Free Enterprise,
he declared, "indicates that the majority of blacks in South Africa have
not yet fully accepted the capitalist or free market system and that they
associate it with discrimination- This is a very serious situation which
places a great responsibility on all business leaders who believe in the
system to ensure that its pursuit is carried out in such a manner that it
will attract and not alienate all population groups in the country. It is
important that blacks, as the majority group, should be given the
opportunity fully to understand and to participate in the benefits of the
free enterprise system because if they do not, their bias will undoubtedly
be towards the socialistic systems which have failed so many African
countries. Inadequate education is the greatest single bar to the ability
of blacks to participate meaningfully in the system and the national
economy."[139]
Education has continued to receive the lion's share of corporate giving
throughout the 1980s. The support offered by capital to this and other
activities constitutes an attempt to deracialise opportunities and rewards
so as, it is hoped, to separate business from apartheid in the minds of
the majority. Linda Chisholm[140] has argued that the initiatives by
employers in the provision of training have not simply been designed to
meet their economic need for technically skilled manpower. The intent, she
contends, has been as much to wed workers more firmly to capitalist values
in an effort to win the allegiance of Africans. In 1983, according to
Urdang, companies ploughed about half the social rand into education, with
health and welfare accounting for some 40% of expenditure.[141] By 1987
the outlays on education had risen to approximately 60% of the total.
Urdang also maintained that South African enterprises, on the whole, had
not developed consistent, fixed criteria for evaluating requests for
funds, with historical patterns of donating being the most important
determinant of the annual contributions budget.[142] From interviews
conducted with officials from a number of the biggest corporations during
December 1987 and January 1988, it appears that the years subsequent to
1983 have seen a growing professionalisation of administrative practices.
Whilst tradition still weighs rather heavily in the choice of causes to
fund, many of the firms have sought to render their operations less ad
hoc. Policies have been devised and formal procedures established, with
formulae and set standards for distributing resources. The degree of
it
specialisation of function, however, does not seem to have reached the
level attained in the United States. People frequently combine social
responsibility tasks with other duties, whilst the departments charged
with community involvement tend to be concerned as well with personnel
matters or public relations.
NOTE: This paper is, of course, incomplete. It is part of a chapter of
an M.A. thesis on the politics of white business in contemporary South
Africa. What will follow will be a discussion of the external and internal
social responsibility of some 20 of the largest companies in South Africa.
This will draw upon interview material and other sources. Thereafter, the
collective efforts of big capital, in the form of the Urban Foundation and
the Small Business Development Corporation, will be examined. Responses to
social responsibility from various quarters will also be considered.
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